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Despite the economic importance of multinational
enterprises ("MNEs"), there is a surprising paucity of
law governing foreign direct investment ("FDI"),
especially in comparison with the abundance of law
governing trade. There is no multilateral legal
arrangement governing FDI that is similar to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
no organization similar to the World Trade
Organization, and almost no courses in law schools on
FDI law. The goal of this Article is to begin to remedy
this state of affairs by proposing a conceptual model
for analyzing the application of the national laws of
home and host countries to MNEs operating within
their territories. This Article also seeks to explain the
extraordinary difficulties in reaching consensus on a
multilateral agreement on investment similar in scope
to the GATT, and to suggest an approach to
negotiating such an agreement in a new multilateral
forum, the World Investment Organization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Multinational enterprises ("MNEs") play a major role in the
world economy.' At the end of 2001, the gross product of all foreign
affiliates of MNEs was estimated at $3.5 trillion, or roughly one tenth
of the world's gross domestic product.' Sales by foreign affiliates of
MNEs, a broad measure of the revenues generated by international
production, reached an estimated $19 trillion in 2001.' By
comparison, world exports in 2001 totaled less than $7.5 trillion.4
1. The choice of terminology in this field is inevitably value-laden. MNEs is the
preferred term of the rich countries and the OECD; developing countries and the U.N. prefer
to call them transnational corporations (TNCs). I use MNEs not out of political preference
but because TNCs is misleading in regard to the legal structure of MNEs (they are typically
not one corporation), which is important for purposes of this Article.
2. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ("UNCTAD"),
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT
COMPETITIVENESS 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WlR/2002 (2002) [hereinafter WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 20021. Gross product is defined as the total value of all goods and
services produced by MNEs.
3. Id. Sales by foreign affiliates is defined as the total value of sales by affiliates of
the MNE outside its country of incorporation to unrelated parties.
4. Id.
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About two-thirds of world trade is conducted by MNEs, and about a
third takes place within MNEs.' MNEs are also responsible for about
75% to 80% of global research and development activities and up to
90% of inter-country technology flows.6
Despite the economic importance of MNEs, there is a
surprising paucity of law governing foreign direct investment
("FDI"), especially in comparison with the abundance of law
governing trade.7  There is no multilateral legal arrangement
governing FDI that is similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), no organization similar to the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), and almost no courses in law schools on FDI
law.8 The goal of this Article is to begin to remedy this state of
affairs by proposing a conceptual model for analyzing the application
of the national laws of home and host countries to MNEs operating
within their territories. 9  This Article also seeks to explain the
extraordinary difficulties in reaching agreement on a multilateral
agreement on investment ("MAI") similar in scope to the GATT, and
to suggest a possible approach to negotiating such an agreement in a
new multilateral forum, the World Investment Organization ("WIO").
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II lays out a
conceptual model or matrix for analyzing the application of national
laws to MNEs. This matrix answers the following questions: When
should a legislator in a home or host country employ the "enterprise
approach" by applying a national law to MNEs operating in her
country on an extraterritorial basis? When, on the other hand, should
she employ the "entity approach" by applying the law only to the part
of the MNE within her country's territory?"°
5. Id. at 4-5.
6. MNEs are the largest source of external finance for developing countries, so they
are particularly important to those countries. Id. at 49-68, 73-84.
7. FDI is defined as the direct ownership of assets or over 10% in the equity of
subsidiaries in another country. At the end of 1999, the stock of FDI stood at $5 trillion. Id.
at 4. The ownership of FDI is highly concentrated: a mere 100 parent firms, based mainly in
developed countries, account for roughly one-eighth of the total assets of all foreign affiliates
of MNEs. Id. at 8.
8. There were nearly 2,000 bilateral investment treaties at the end of 1999, but these
are rarely discussed in the legal literature. Id. at 8. An on-line LexisNexis "US & Canadian
Law Reviews, Combined" database search conducted on September 24, 2003 produced only
11 results for "bilateral investment treaty" appearing in the title, compared to 209 for
"GATT" and 362 for "WTO."
9. The home country of an MN is the country in which its parent corporation is
incorporated (where the MNE has its headquarters). All other countries in which the MNE
operates are called host countries.
10. The entity approach involves applying the laws of each country in which the MNE
operates only to the part of the MNE that is located within its borders.
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Parts III through VI of this Article then apply the model
developed in Part II to specific areas of law. Part III discusses
applications in which the entity approach is preferable, with
occasional deviations on the basis of comity. The examples are
drawn from areas of private law such as contracts and torts. Parts IV
and V discuss applications in which the enterprise approach is
preferable. Part IV discusses applications in which the preferred
approach is the extraterritorial extension of a country's laws to the
MNE on a unilateral basis. Examples are drawn from criminal law
(e.g., corruption), labor law, bankruptcy, and tax. Part V analyzes
situations in which the preferred approach is harmonization of the
relevant laws in an appropriate international forum. Examples are
taken from constitutional law (e.g., anti-discrimination), antitrust, and
trading with the enemy laws. Finally, Part VI concludes by
recommending the establishment of a WIO to facilitate discussion of
the areas in which harmonization is the preferred approach.
II. THE MATRIX
Suppose a member of the U.S. Congress is drafting legislation
that applies to MNEs. The question arises whether the proposed bill
should apply to the operations of the MNE outside the territorial
limits of the United States."' How should the member of Congress
decide this question?
The issue of extraterritoriality as applied to MNEs involves
the choice between two approaches, which Philip Blumberg has
named the entity and the enterprise approaches. 2 Under the entity
approach, each country in which a MNE operates applies its own law
solely to the unit or units of the MNE doing business within the
country's territory. If the MNE is organized in the standard way with
a parent corporation in the home country and subsidiaries in the host
country, the entity approach requires each country to apply its law to
the corporation(s) incorporated under its laws and to no other. The
11. The Supreme Court has held that, for U.S. legislation to have extraterritorial
application, Congress must state so explicitly. EEOC v. Arab Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991). Interestingly, ARAMCO operated in Saudi Arabia through a branch, and not
through a subsidiary, so the issue did not involve applying the law (Title VII) to a foreign
corporation. But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (challenging
the presumption in EEOC v. Arab Am. Oil Co.).
12. PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 63
(1993) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE]; Philip Blumberg, The
Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary
Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 295-96 (1996).
[42:5
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entity approach is the standard or default rule in international law and
the preferred approach of most commentators.
3
The alternative is the enterprise approach, under which a
single rule of law applies to the entire MNE. The enterprise approach
can be implemented in two ways. One possibility is
extraterritoriality, in which a single country, usually the home
country, applies its laws to the entire MNE. The other possibility is
harmonization, in which the various countries in which the MNE
operates agree on a single harmonized set of rules to govern the
MNE. A minority of commentators, most prominently Blumberg,
prefer the enterprise approach."i
The choice between entity and enterprise approaches is related
to another debated issue: whether MNEs have nationality-i.e.,
whether they can be identified as belonging primarily to a single
jurisdiction, the home country. Before the 1980s, it was common to
assume that MNEs were identified with their home countries and that,
for example, "what is good for GM is good for America."15
Commentators from both the right and left have recently questioned
this assumption, arguing that NINEs are profit-maximizing enterprises
with no particular national allegiance. 6 Such commentators point out
that the sources of capital, business operations (research and
development, production, and distribution), employees, and customers
of MNEs are increasingly global, rather than concentrated in any
particular country. Others disagree, citing the fact that both
management and key business operations are still located in the home
country."' The first view, which holds that MNEs lack nationality,
fits more naturally with the entity approach, although an enterprise
approach based on harmonization is also possible. The second view,
which holds that MNEs have nationality, fits with an enterprise
approach based on extraterritorial application of the home country's
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 213,
414, 414 cmts. b, c (1987); EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS 69-100 (1996).
14. BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 168-200; PETER
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW (1995); RAYMOND VERNON, IN
THE HURRICANE'S EYE: THE TROUBLED PROSPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1998).
15. See, e.g., Raymond Vernon, The Multinational Enterprise: Power Versus
Sovereignty, 49 FOREIGN AFF. 736 (1971); JEAN-JACQUES SERVAN SCHREIBER, THE
AMERICAN CHALLENGE 3-30, 153-56 (1968); Osvaldo Sunkel, Big Business and
Dependencia: A Latin American View, 50 FOREIGN AFF. 517 (1972).
16. See Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us?, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 53 (1990); EDWARD M.
GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 57-84
(3d ed. 1995).
17. Laura Tyson, They Are Not Us, THE AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1991, at 37.
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laws.
Neither Blumberg nor other commentators have offered a
conceptual model for answering the question of how to choose
between these three approaches: the entity approach, harmonization,
and unilateral extraterritoriality. 8 Therefore, they are not helpful in
resolving the dilemma faced by our legislator. This Part will attempt
to outline such a conceptual framework by using a matrix.
There are two distinct issues that are relevant to answering the
extraterritoriality question. The first is goal-oriented: To what extent
does the purpose of the legislation require its extraterritorial
application to the entire MNE? The second is practical: To what
extent will the legislation, if applied on an enterprise-wide basis,
conflict with the policies of other jurisdictions and/or with the
preferences of the MNE itself? 9 These two issues can be drawn as
two axes of a matrix: a horizontal axis (X) and a vertical axis (Y).
The horizontal axis (X) can be divided into three segments.
The first segment involves laws that usually have only local relevance
so that their purpose generally does not require extraterritorial
application. An example is speed limits on the highway: There is no
reason why they should apply uniformly to an entire MNE, or even
beyond a particular stretch of highway, because the purpose is to
make all vehicles on that stretch of road obey the same rule. The
second segment involves laws that achieve part of their purpose by
being applied within a country, but that ideally would apply
extraterritorially as well. Most criminal laws as well as laws having
some moral dimension fall into this category. For example, child
labor laws achieve some of their purpose if they protect children in
one country from exploitation, but in an ideal world, all children
would be protected. The third segment involves laws that do not
achieve any of their purposes unless they are applied extraterritorially.
A classic example, discussed below, is trading with the enemy
legislation because its purpose can be completely defeated (as history
shows) if subsidiaries are permitted to trade. Many economic laws,
such as antitrust, bankruptcy, and tax, fall into this category as well.
18. For other approaches to a similar question, see Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law:
New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 (2002); Joel Trachtman, Economic Analysis of
Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
19. While the preferences of other countries are likely to be accorded some weight in
any conflict of laws analysis, it may surprise the reader that I accord any weight to the
preferences of the MNEs themselves. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989). But an extensive history has shown that progress on many
issues related to MNEs depends crucially on the degree to which the MNEs themselves were
interested in advocating an enterprise approach. For a discussion of corruption and tax, see
infra Part IV.A-C.
[42:5
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The vertical axis (Y) of the matrix can also be divided into
three segments. In the first segment the policies of other jurisdictions
conflict with the policies underlying the law in question. Such
conflict can be expressed either in specific, conflicting legislation or
in other ways, such as diplomatic protests.20  For example, other
countries may not share the foreign policy goals embodied in trading
with the enemy legislation. In the second segment the policies of
other jurisdictions are in basic agreement with the policy of the law at
issue, but the MNEs themselves do not wish for the law to be applied
throughout the enterprise. Tax law is a classic example: Countries are
in general agreement that the profits of MNEs should only be taxed
once, but the MNEs, while seeking to prevent double taxation, do not
object to double non-taxation. Finally, the third segment of the
vertical axis is comprised of issues on which both countries and
MNEs are in general agreement. Both countries and MNEs, for
example, agree that bribery of their officials should be discouraged,
whatever the private view of the officials in question.2'









Law does not Law partially Law requires XAxis
require requires extraterritoriality
extraterritoriality extraterritoriality
20. This view of policy conflict is not limited to what Currie terms "true conflict"-i.e.,
when it is not possible to obey both laws simultaneously. Rather, the issue is whether there is
a divergence in fundamental policies of the countries in question, as expressed both in their
laws and by other means. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 177-
87 (1963).
21. It is also possible to envisage situations in which the MNEs agree but the countries
do not. Such may be the case, for example, in the gender discrimination area, in which the
MNEs may prefer to expand their pool of human capital by hiring more women even if the
host countries disapprove. But I have not included such a fourth row because I believe that if
the countries disagree, harmonization is the best option, even if the MNEs agree. The
agreement by MNEs has significant implications for the prospect for harmonization.
HeinOnline  -- 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 11 2003-2004
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The decision of our legislator can now be seen as depending
on where the particular legal issue she faces falls within the above
matrix. In general, if the law falls within the first column on the
horizontal axis, the law should not be applied extraterritorially, i.e.,
the entity approach is preferred. If the law falls within the second and
third columns of the horizontal axis, the choice of whether to apply it
extraterritorially depends on its position on the vertical axis. If the
legal issue falls within one of the top two rows of the vertical axis, the
law should be applied extraterritorially. If the legal issue is in the
bottom row on the vertical axis, the law should not be applied
extraterritorially, but efforts at achieving a harmonized solution
should be given high priority.
The above analysis is summarized on the matrix below:
Y.Axis
Countries and Comity Extraterritoriality Extraterritoriality
MNEs agree
Countries Comity Extraterritoriality Extraterritoriality
agree but
MNEs do not
Countries Comity Harmonization Harmonization
disagree
Law does not Law partially Law requires XAxis
require requires extraterritoriality
extraterritoriality extraterritoriality
Comity refers to a situation in which a country's laws do not
normally apply extraterritorially (the entity approach is preferred), but
can be applied extraterritorially by courts on a case-by-case basis.
Examples of this outcome from private law (torts and contracts) are
described in Part III. Extraterritoriality refers to the unilateral
extraterritorial application of the home country's law to a NNE
whose parent is incorporated in that country. In most situations, host
countries may then refrain from applying their law to those MNEs so
that each MNE is governed entirely by the law of the home country.
This approach is labeled extraterritoriality with reciprocity.22
22. Countries may object to having the law of another country apply within their
territory as a matter of sovereignty, even if they agree with the policy of the law in question.
But in today's world, some measure of extraterritorial application of laws is inevitable. See
Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 Sup.
[42:5
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Examples from various areas of law, such as corruption, bankruptcy,
tax, and child labor, are described in Part IV. Harmonization refers to
situations in which the law should not be applied extraterritorially on
a unilateral basis, but efforts should be made to achieve a harmonized
solution. Part V describes examples of this approach, such as trading
with the enemy, discrimination, and antitrust. Part VI proposes the
establishment of a WIO to provide a forum for such negotiations.
III. COMITY
The examples in this Part are drawn from two areas of private
law: torts and contracts. In general, private law may tend to fall
within the first column of the horizontal axis-i.e., the law does not
require extraterritoriality because it deals primarily with local issues,
such as the protection of property rights in a jurisdiction or damages
for a tort occurring in the jurisdiction. Cross-border contracts may be
seen as an exception, but even they can usually be dealt with locally
since they typically involve a choice of law provision either explicitly
or by default.
A. Torts: The Bhopal Case
On the night of December 2, 1984, a deadly gas (methyl
isocyanate) was released from a chemical plant operated in Bhopal,
India by Union Carbide India Limited ("UCIL"), a 51% owned
subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corporation ("UCC"), a Delaware
corporation. The result was the most devastating industrial disaster in
history-the death of over 2,000 persons and injuries to over 200,000.
Four days later, the first of 145 class actions against UCC was
commenced in federal district court. The cases were consolidated
before Judge John F. Keenan of the Southern District of New York.
Judge Keenan eventually dismissed the actions with certain
conditions, and the dismissal was upheld on appeal. The most
important condition was that UCC agree to submit to the jurisdiction
of Indian courts. Ultimately, UCC settled the Indian cases for about
$850 million, which was disbursed to the victims after long delays.23
On its face, the decision in the Bhopal case involved a
CT. REV. 179 (1991). In addition, the fact that extraterritoriality is applied only to MNEs and
that reciprocity is available may help to assuage sovereignty concerns.
23. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
HeinOnline  -- 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 13 2003-2004
COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
straightforward application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The Bhopal plant was owned and operated by UCIL, an Indian
corporation, 49% of which was owned by Indians. Although the plant
was originally designed by UCC, the design was changed many times
during the ten years of construction. No Americans were employed at
the plant, and none had visited it for a year prior to the accident. The
accident had occurred in India, the victims were all Indians, and the
witnesses were mostly Indian.
2 4
However, one major hurdle blocked the transferring of the
case to Indian courts: Under generally accepted principles of
international law, Indian courts would not have jurisdiction over UCC
because it had no connection with India other than its ownership of
stock in UCIL. If recovery were limited to the assets of UCIL, then it
only would have consisted of the defunct Bhopal plant. Therefore,
the Union of India, which acted on behalf of the victims, sought from
the beginning to extend jurisdiction to UCC on an extraterritorial
basis (host country extraterritoriality). Judge Keenan agreed,
conditioning his dismissal of the action on UCC's agreement to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Indian courts, a condition that was
upheld on appeal.25 As a result, the case was settled by UCC in India.
The question of whether limited liability should protect
shareowners from tort liabilities resulting from corporate activity has
been debated extensively.26 Whatever view one takes on this issue,
some of the problems, such as determining who the shareholders are
and apportioning the liability, disappear in the context of a M-NE.27
But other issues remain. In particular, commentators have disagreed
on whether the internalization of the harm caused by the corporation
24. Id. at 200-01. Ironically, both the minority ownership and the all-Indian operation
of the plant were "performance requirements" imposed by the Indian government as a
condition for agreeing to allow UCC to invest in India. Such requirements are frequently
imposed by developing countries seeking to force MNEs to transfer technology to them,
since technology transfer is generally considered the aspect of FDI most likely to generate
vertical externalities. See Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden, On the Theory of the
Transnational Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM 9 (Christos N. Pitelis &
Roger Sugden eds., 1991); Edward K.Y. Chen, Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (1993) (Edward
K.Y. Chen ed., 1993).
25. 809 F.2d at 203.
26. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited
Shareholder Liability through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992).
27. Because the only shareholder of the subsidiary is the parent or another affiliate,
some of the technical issues that arise for public shareholders do not apply in the MNE
context. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
[42:5
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and the monitoring of the subsidiary would be improved by imposing
liability on its corporate parent, or whether this would excessively
deter risk-taking.28 In general, American courts have tended to favor
the latter view. They have refused to "pierce the corporate veil" by
imposing liability on corporate parents when not expressly required
by statute to do SO.
2 9
Whatever the merits of this debate, it is clear that current law
does not require an enterprise approach to all tort cases involving
subsidiaries of MNEs, although courts frequently pierce the veil in
those cases because of the involuntary nature of the liability and its
implications for monitoring and cost internalization." It would
therefore appear that this category of cases falls into the first column
of the horizontal axis, and that comity, a case-by-case determination
of whether an enterprise approach should be applied, is the preferred
solution. The Bhopal case would thus represent an exception, in
which the extraordinary nature of the case caused the U.S. court to
approve of a remedy that effectively implemented an enterprise
approach of host country extraterritoriality. It is not clear that such a
remedy should be applied in all toxic tort cases.
B. Contracts: The Deltec Litigation
The Deltec litigation involved an Argentine corporation, Cia-
Swift, that was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Bahamas corporation,
Deltec.31 Creditors of Cia-Swift (the largest Argentine meatpacker)
sued to force it into bankruptcy reorganization. A company-
appointed referee originally found that the company's assets exceeded
its liabilities, even including inter-company debts. However, at the
insistence of a minor creditor with a $4,000 claim, the Argentine
court extended the liabilities of Cia-Swift to the entire Deltec
enterprise by relying on the "unified structure of decision and interest
28. Id.; BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 121-48; Joseph A.
Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102
YALE L.J. 387 (1992).
29. BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 121-48; Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036
(1991).
30. BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 190.
31. "Compania Swift de la Plata S.A.," 146 L.L. 601 (1972), translated in Michael W.
Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAW. AM. 320
(1974); see also Deltec Banking Corp. v. Compania Italo Argentina de Electricidad S.A.,
available at 171 N.Y.L.J. 18, at col. 1.
HeinOnline  -- 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 15 2003-2004
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
which makes [the Deltec enterprise] a single unit. 32 The Argentine
Supreme Court affirmed, declaring that grave national interests were
at stake in the relationship between the "interdependence, linkages
and multinational nature" of the MNEs, on the one hand, and the"paramount interests of [Argentine] society," on the other.33 The
court therefore extended the liabilities to the entire Deltec group,
applying the enterprise approach of host country extraterritoriality.34
The Deltec decision evoked "severe international hostility."35
A New York court declared that:
There is little doubt that the finding of Bankruptcy in
Argentina is not in conformity with American
Statutory or decisional law .... The determination
that plaintiff is Bankrupt because it is one segment of a
chain of corporations, one of which is insolvent, may
under our laws amount under certain circumstances to
a confiscation of property.3b
The court therefore refused to follow that judgment, and it was
affirmed on appeal.37
The application of enterprise principles is more questionable
here than in the Bhopal case because the Argentine creditors were
largely voluntary-they extended credit to Cia-Swift in full awareness
of limited liability laws-and could have negotiated for a guarantee
from Deltec. On the other hand, some of the creditors, including the
one with a claim for $4,000, were trade creditors and therefore closer
to involuntary creditors. In this case as well, the correct approach
appears to be the entity approach with occasional piercing of the
corporate veil, to be respected or not by other courts on the basis of
comity. Argentina's attempt to codify the result in Deltec into its law
was not respected by other jurisdictions and was promptly repealed
when the Peronistas lost power in 1976.38
32. Compania Swift, 146 L.L. at 603.
33. "Compania Swift de la Plata S.A.," CSJN 151 L.L. 516 (1973), translated in
Gordon, supra note 31, at 33 7-38.
34. BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 188.
35. Id. at 189.
36. Deltec Banking Corp., 171 N.Y.L.J. at 18.
37. Deltec Banking Corp. v. Compania Italo Argentina de Electricidad S.A., 362
N.Y.S.2d 391 (1974).
38. BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 189.
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IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The examples in this Part illustrate situations in which the
purpose of the law fully or partially requires extraterritorial
application, and in which the other jurisdictions involved agree in
principle with the underlying purposes of the law in question, even
though they may not agree with many of the detailed rules. In these
circumstances, the unilateral application of the law on an
extraterritorial basis to the entire MNE is justified. The home country
would usually be the one applying its law to the entire MNE. The
other countries would either cede jurisdiction or apply their own law
concurrently within their territory.
This Part will first consider examples in which the MNEs
themselves agree with the underlying purpose of the law in question
(the top row of the matrix), and then examples in which they disagree
(the middle row of the matrix). The first type constitutes the most
promising area for extraterritorial application of the law, because, in
those cases, the MNEs would prefer that the law be applied
extraterritorially, and the only constraint is their concern about
competition with other MNEs (whose countries do not apply the law
extraterritorially). However, this Part also argues that the law should
be applied extraterritorially in the second type of cases as well to
overcome similar "prisoners' dilemma" situations.
A. Corruption
In 1977, the United States adopted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act ("FCPA").39 The FCPA was the outcome of an
extensive post-Watergate investigation by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission of bribes paid by U.S. MNEs to foreign
officials, which led to the disgrace of the Prime Minister of Japan and
the Prince Consort of the Netherlands.4" The FCPA applies to U.S.
corporations, citizens, and residents, as well as foreign corporations
whose shares trade in the U.S. securities market. It applies
specifically to foreign corrupt practices outside the United States.4"
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l, 2 (1977).
40. For the history of the FCPA, see generally Alejandro Posadas, Combating
Corruption under International Law, 10 DUKE J. COM. & INT'L L. 345 (2000). On the
problem of corruption and its adverse economic effects, see generally SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(g), 2(i).
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The Act criminalizes any "offer, authorization of payment, or
payment of anything of value" to certain foreign recipients including
foreign government officials.42 The payment must be made for the
purpose of influencing any act or decision of the foreign recipient in
his official capacity, inducing the foreign official to act, or refrain
from acting, in violation of his lawful duty, securing any improper
advantage, or inducing such foreign recipient to use his influence to
affect decisions of governments or instrumentalities. 3
The impact of this unilateral extraterritorial extension of U.S.
law to primarily U.S. MNEs has been much debated. On the one
hand, some scholars have argued that the FCPA reflects "cultural
imperialism": Payments considered commonplace in one culture may
be considered corrupt in another.4 This issue was addressed to some
extent by a 1988 amendment to the FCPA, which clarified that it does
not apply to payments that are lawful in the jurisdiction of the foreign
recipient.45  Another strand of criticism relates to the FCPA's
effectiveness. Some scholars have argued that U.S. MNEs have in
fact done little to respond to the FCPA, and a recent Bribe Payers
Index published by Transparency International shows that twenty-five
years after the enactment of the FCPA the United States ranks an
unimpressive nine out of nineteen on corporate propensity to bribe
senior officials."6 Other studies, however, have tended to show that
the FCPA has been effective in curbing some foreign corrupt
behaviors by U.S. MNEs.4  In particular, U.S. MNEs certainly seem
to have felt that the FCPA put them at a competitive disadvantage
42. Id. § 78dd-l(a)(3),2(a)(3).
43. Id. § 78dd-l(a), 2(a), 3(a).
44. GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
129 (1982); Steven R. Salbu, Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 435, 446, 454 (2001). But even Salbu, the most consistent critic of the FCPA, admits
that some bribes are clearly unethical. Id. at 438-39.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1), 2(c)(1). The mere absence of a foreign law criminalizing
the practice does not, however, remove the taint.
46. Salbu, supra note 44, at 452 n.85; Mary Jane Sheffet, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Did They Change
Corporate Behavior?, 14 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 290 (1995).
47. JAMES R. HINES, FORBIDDEN PAYMENT: FOREIGN BRIBERY AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
AFTER 1977 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995); Paul J. Beck
et al., The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. Exports, 12(4) MANAGERIAL
& DECISION ECON. 295 (1991) (stating that "the results of the study provide evidence that the
FCPA had a negative effect on U.S. exports to non-Latin American countries"); Christopher
Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive Disadvantage, But For How Long?,
2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289 (1994) (reviewing empirical studies that indicate FCPA had
significant effect); Michael W. Maher, The Impact of Regulation on Controls: Firms'
Response to the FCPA, 56 ACCT. REv. 751 (1981) (indicating that most firms incurred
expenditures to comply with FCPA).
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against MNEs from other countries that lacked similar legislation (in
Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, foreign bribes were both
legal and tax-deductible).48 Their response was at first to lobby the
U.S. government to change the FCPA, which led to some
modifications of the Act in 1988. Most significantly, the 1988
amendments established a "grease payment" exception, providing that
the Act does not apply to payments made to foreign government
officials for "routine government action."49  But the scope of this
exception is unclear, and the core provisions of the FCPA remained
unchanged."
The U.S. MNEs then tried a new approach under the Clinton
Administration: they attempted to persuade other developed countries
to adopt legislation similar to the FCPA. This approach bore fruit in
1997, when the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), joined by five other countries, formally
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, which came into
force in 1999."
The OECD Convention represents a significant achievement."
OECD member countries are home to about 90% of the world's
MNEs, and the addition of countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, raises the percentage of MNEs covered even higher. The
OECD Convention includes the main provisions of the FCPA,
including criminalizing foreign bribery. Article 1 of the Convention
establishes the parties' unqualified obligation, specifically:
to take such measures as may be necessary to establish
that it is a criminal offence under its law for any
person intentionally to offer, promise or give any
undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly
or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official,
for that official or for a third party, in order that the
official act or refrain from acting in relation to the
48. Hall, supra note 47, at 303.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b), 2(b) (as amended by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107).
50. Salbu, supra note 44, at 449-53.
51. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
52. For debate on the OECD Convention, see Stanley J. Marcuss & Seth Goldschlager,
An Uneven International Playing Field, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1997, at A25; Stuart
Eizenstat, The Anti-Bribery Treaty, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1998, at A20; Stephanie Flanders,
Clear Thinking on Corruption, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 1997, at 10.
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performance of official duties, or in order to obtain or
retain business or other improper advantage .... "
The Convention also includes the two exceptions to the
FCPA: the legally allowed conduct exception and the grease
payments exception. 4 In general, the intent of the Convention is to
achieve "functional equivalence" of the laws of the signatory
countries, while recognizing that differences in legal systems-e.g.,
the degree to which corporations can be made criminally liable-
preclude complete identity.
From the perspective outlined above, corruption clearly falls
within the central column of the horizontal axis: In an ideal world,
bribes are illegal both domestically and overseas so that the purpose
of legislation to combat bribes can best be achieved by applying it
extraterritorially. On the vertical axis, bribes to domestic officials are
illegal in almost every country, and the MNEs themselves would
prefer not to pay them. Thus, corruption falls in the top row of the
vertical axis. The only argument against applying an anti-corruption
law extraterritorially is that it can place domestic MNEs at a
competitive disadvantage. However, when both the countries and the
INEs agree with the underlying purpose of the law, this prisoners'
dilemma can be overcome. Although each country may be reluctant
to apply its law extraterritorially for fear of disadvantaging its MNEs,
if one country does so, others can be induced to follow suit. This is
what happened with the FCPA and the OECD Convention, which
effectively removed the competitiveness problem by applying the
FCPA to most, if not all, MNEs. Thus, the corruption example is a
classic case in which unilateral extraterritoriality by one country, the
United States, was able to achieve some good, in part because of the
incentive effect on U.S. MNEs that strenuously lobbied for the OECD
Convention.
B. Bankruptcy
In the area of international bankruptcies, there has been a
long-standing consensus that the correct policy outcome only can be
achieved under "universalism," i.e., an enterprise approach. Under
this approach, a single court in the home country of the debtor (or in
53. OECD Convention, supra note 51, art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at 4.
54. Id. cmts. 8-9.
55. Id.
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this case, the parent of a MNE) determines the allocation of all the
assets of the debtor among all its creditors. In contrast, the prevailing
legal regime in actual international bankruptcies is "territorialism,"
i.e., an entity approach, where the creditors in each jurisdiction get the
assets that are located in that jurisdiction when bankruptcy is
declared. 6
The debate between universalism and territorialism involves
precisely the type of considerations underlying the matrix described
above. On the horizontal axis, there is general agreement that the
universalists' approach is better because it leads to a more rational
division of the assets among creditors and reduces the transaction
costs of litigating the bankruptcy in multiple fora. The debate,
however, revolves around the vertical axis. Universalists like Jay
Westbrook and Andrew Guzman see few areas of disagreement
among countries in according priority to different claims in
bankruptcy. Territorialists like Lynn LoPucki see many areas of
disagreement, in particular involving priority accorded to the rights of
employees.57
Lucian Bebchuk and Andrew Guzman show that from an ex
ante perspective, the interests of both countries and MVNEs favor
universalism. The MNEs favor universalism; since creditors adjust
their lending terms to take territorialism into account, the borrowing
NIE bears the cost of territorialism. Countries also favor
universalism; since on average they are unlikely to gain from a
territorialist approach, the welfare loss from territorialism falls on
them. However, Bebchuk and Guzman also identify a prisoners'
dilemma: If other countries are universalist, it is in the interest of any
given country to be territorialist because it would attract more FDI
56. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of
Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000) [hereinafter Guzman, International
Bankruptcy]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Andrew T.
Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & EcON. 775 (1999).
Most countries are overtly territorialist in their approach-e.g., Japan, and even countries like
the United States and the United Kingdom, despite the fact that both are more open to foreign
administration. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (allowing a foreign representative to petition the
bankruptcy court to turn over a U.S. debtor's assets to the foreign creditor). When the
interests of domestic creditors might be adversely affected, however, even these countries are
likely to become territorialist in practice. See, e.g., Overseas Inn v. United States, 911 F.2d
1146 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to grant comity to Luxembourg court reorganization plan
when it would prejudice IRS claim for unpaid taxes); Bebchuk & Guzman, supra; see also
Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies through Private Ordering, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000).
57. LoPucki, supra note 56, at 710-11. But see Guzman, International Bankruptcy,
supra note 56, at 2197-98 (arguing that in practice there is considerably more agreement in
employment rather than bankruptcy statutes).
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and the presumed vertical externalities.58 Thus, all countries would
defect by choosing territorialism, and the first best equilibrium will
not be achieved.
On our matrix, bankruptcy thus belongs in the top right hand
corner: An enterprise approach is required on the horizontal axis, and
both countries and MNEs agree on the vertical axis. Therefore, home
countries should unilaterally extend their bankruptcy law to MNEs
whose parent is incorporated there.59 The key issue is whether host
countries will respect such extraterritorial jurisdiction, which may
disadvantage their creditors. However, to the extent that host
countries are also home countries, which has been true in most of the
significant international bankruptcies-e.g., Maxwell, BCCI,
Olympia, and Yorke-agreement should be possible through a regime
of reciprocity.6 ° Under reciprocity, a host country will agree to cede
jurisdiction to a home country in exchange for the home country's
agreement to cede jurisdiction when it is the host country. In
practice, there has been significant progress in this area, as evidenced
by the wide acceptance of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency. 62 The Model Law defines the home country as the
country in which the "center of main interest" of the bankrupt MNE is
located, and urges courts of the host country to impose a stay and
transfer assets to be divided under the jurisdiction of the home
country's court. However, in a concession to territorialist countries,
this procedure can be blocked by filing a separate proceeding in the
58. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 56, at 804; see also Frederick Tung, Is
International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 52-69 (2001) (arguing that
universalism is not feasible from a game theory perspective).
59. In some cases, it may be difficulty to identify the home country. See LoPucki,
supra note 56, at 713. In the vast majority of cases, however, this is not a problem. See
Guzman, International Bankruptcy, supra note 56, at 2207. United States bankruptcy law
extends to assets outside the United States, and the doctrine of substantive consolidation
makes it easy to include an entire NINE. See U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, MODEL
LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. SALES No. E.99.V.3,
art. 17(2)(a) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW] (recognizing a foreign proceeding if it
takes place in the country where the debtor's center of main interests is located).
60. See IAN F. FLETCHER, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (1990).
61. There may be substantive areas of disagreement that relate to the ultimate goal of
bankruptcy law as opposed to detailed priorities, e.g., the tendency of U.S. law to favor
reorganization and of U.K. law to favor liquidation. But this type of divergence affects
mostly policies of home countries and thus can be resolved by agreeing that home country
law will control-i.e., U.S. NINEs will be governed by U.S. law and U.K. MNEs by U.K.
law.
62. The UNCITRAL Model Law was completed with input from 36 members and 40
observers of UNCITRAL. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational
Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276 (2000).
[42:5
HeinOnline  -- 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 22 2003-2004
2003] NATIONAL REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 23
host country.63
C. Tax
In the area of tax law, it is easy to show that the enterprise
approach is needed on the horizontal axis. Decades of experience
have shown that the entity approach to taxing MNEs-i.e., separate
accounting-is not feasible and that the only viable alternative is an
enterprise approach consisting of worldwide combined reporting with
formulary apportionment.64 Moreover, countries generally agree that
the goal of the international tax regime should be to tax MNEs once at
a rate of between 30% and 40%.65 One problem with achieving this
goal is that it is not shared by the MNEs, who prefer not to be
overtaxed but also do not mind being undertaxed. Thus, tax belongs
in the last column of the horizontal axis and the middle row of the
vertical axis. Another problem is that even though countries agree on
the need to tax MNEs at their source, tax competition drives them to
refrain from doing so since they fear that they will drive FDI to other
countries that grant tax holidays.66
The solution is for home countries to tax their MNEs on an
enterprise-wide basis, while granting a credit for source country
taxation.67 This will remove the incentive for source countries to
engage in tax competition and enable them to levy their tax. Despite
the concern about harming the competitiveness of its MNEs, the
United States can adopt this rule unilaterally. Experience has shown
that when the United States first adopted this rule for the passive
income of its MNEs in 1962, the U.S. MNEs induced other home
countries to adopt similar rules. Moreover, the experience of the
OECD Convention has demonstrated that the OECD can be a good
forum for resolving competitiveness concerns; in fact, the OECD is
committed to expanding home country tax jurisdiction to combat
63. In practice, such proceedings may be more difficult to maintain than before the
Model Law was adopted.
64. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall ofArm's Length: A Study in the Evolution
of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89 (1995).
65. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996).
66. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
67. The source country is the country from which the income derives; the home or
residence country is the country in which the parent of the MNE is incorporated.
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harmful tax competition.68 The remaining issue is defining the source
of active income for purposes of host country taxation and foreign tax
credit. The best solution is a default formula, which was recently
recommended by the EU Commission for inter-EU transactions.69
D. Child Labor
The problem of child labor has been one of the more
contentious issues facing MNEs in the last few decades.7" On one
hand, child advocacy non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and
some Western governments have been pushing for the "total
elimination" of all forms of child labor through the International
Labor Office ("ILO") and, in some cases, the WTO. On the other
hand, developing countries have generally been resistant to such
moves, which they see as a disguised form of protectionism and a
form of cultural imposition. MNEs have been caught in the middle,
and some-e.g., Nike-have been the target of campaigns and
pressure from both sides.
In the specific context of MNEs, however, the issues can be
narrowed somewhat.71 First, the cultural imperialism problem is less
present in this context because FDI in developing countries is less
than a century old and traditional child labor practices have been
followed for many centuries.72 Second, the most contentious issue for
most developing countries is their opposition to the linkage between
child labor or any labor standards and trade sanctions.73 This issue is
68. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION (1998)
(though admittedly covering less than full home country taxation on an enterprise-wide
basis).
69. EUR. COMM'N, COMPANY TAXATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (2001) (describing
formulae used in the United States at the state level and in Canada, without recommending a
specific formula for the European Union).
70. See generally Christopher M. Kern, Child Labor: The International Law and
Corporate Impact, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 177 (2000); David M. Smolin, Conflict
and Ideology in the International Campaign Against Child Labor, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 383 (1999); Kristin Weldon, Piercing the Silence or Lulling You to Sleep: The Sounds of
Child Labor, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 227 (2001).
71. See Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (200 1) (arguing that MNEs can be held responsible under
international law for behavior that violates human rights).
72. For an argument on why the cultural imperialism question (here in the context of
female genital mutilation) does not actually pose a problem for human rights abuses, see
Riane Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theory of Action, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 287,
296 (1987).
73. See Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial
Declaration, adopted Dec. 13, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997).
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not directly raised in the MNE context.
Instead, one can frame the child labor issue in this context
more narrowly by looking at the matrix. Child labor belongs in the
middle column of the horizontal axis: Child labor laws in home
countries are designed primarily to protect children in the home
country, but in an ideal world, they would protect children in other
countries as well.
As for the vertical axis, there has been a significant measure of
agreement by countries on the goal of abolishing at least the most
egregious forms of child labor. First, most countries have laws
against child labor on the books, although enforcement in developing
countries is sporadic. Second, almost all countries-the United States
being a notorious exception-have ratified the U.N. 1989 Convention
on the Rights of the Child ("CRC").74 The CRC includes a
requirement for State Parties to protect children from hazardous and
harmful employment, to ensure that employment does not interfere
with a child's education, and to establish minimum ages for
employment.75 Third, in 1998, the ILO adopted a Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which binds all 174
members of the ILO to "respect, promote and realize" the principles
of the seven core ILO Conventions, including the 1973 Minimum
Age Convention.76 Thus, although most ILO members have not yet
ratified the 1973 Convention or the 1999 Convention on the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, the 1998
Declaration can be seen as a statement that, in principle, they do not
support child labor and would like to abolish it if they could
economically afford to do so.
While the MNEs would prefer not to see home country
legislation on child labor extended extraterritorially, this
extraterritorial application is appropriate given the level of agreement
that has been reached on this issue. Extending home country laws to
MNEs operating abroad neither impinges on long-held cultural
traditions nor offends deeply held host country policies favoring child
labor. It also does not prevent child labor from occurring in the host
country outside the MNE context-that is left to host country control,
74. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25. U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter CRC]. The
United States is the only major country not to have ratified the CRC (the other non-parties are
Somalia and East Timor). Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights
Treaties, available at http://www.unchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited June 19, 2003).
75. CRC, supra note 74, art. 32, U.N. Doc. No. A/44/736, 1989.
76. Smolin, supra note 70, at 420-21.
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to be exercised as economic circumstances permit. It, however, does
prevent MNEs from directly employing children, which sends a
significant symbolic message (more than voluntary codes of conduct
can achieve). While the children may work elsewhere, it also is
conceivable that the higher wages earned by adults working for the
MNEs may enable some of these children to go to school.
V. HARMONIZATION
This Part will consider examples in which the purpose of the
legislation requires its extraterritorial application, but the countries'
policies fundamentally diverge. Under these circumstances, unilateral
extraterritoriality is likely to be self-defeating. Instead, the proper
response is to attempt to negotiate a harmonized solution to those
issues that offer some possibility of agreement, while refraining from
action on the other issues. The proper forum for such negotiations
will be discussed in Part V.
A. Trading with the Enemy
Trading with the enemy is the area in which the application of
the entity or enterprise approach has been the focus of attention for
the longest period. The issue first surfaced during World War I, when
laws were adopted in both the United Kingdom and the United States
to prohibit trading with the "enemy," defined to include enemy
corporations. The issue then arose whether this legislation prohibited
trading with domestic corporations controlled by enemy parents. In a
decision rendered at the height of the war, the House of Lords held
that if enemy control could be established, the law applied in this
situation as well (the host country enterprise approach).77 In a
decision rendered well after the war was over, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the law did not apply to domestic corporations (the
entity approach).78
The futility of an entity approach to this issue soon became
apparent. During World War II, the U.S. Congress amended the
Trading with the Enemy Act to include all corporations directly or
indirectly controlled by the enemy. Although the definition of
"enemy" was not amended, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
77. Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., 2 A.C. 307 (H.L. 1916).
78. Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457,473 (1925).
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expanded application. 9  Thus, it became the established
understanding that trading with the enemy legislation had to be
extended on an enterprise-wide basis to be effective.8"
These early cases involved host country applications in
wartime. Trouble arose, however, when the same principle was
extended to home country extraterritoriality in times of peace. At the
height of the Cold War in the 1950s, both U.S. MNEs and U.S. allies
accepted the extraterritorial application of trading with the enemy
legislation. As the Cold War alliance began to unravel during the
1960s, host countries began to object. Thus, in 1965 a French court
approved a petition by the minority shareholders of Fruehauf-France,
a 66% subsidiary of Fruehauf Corporation (U.S.), to appoint an
administrator to carry out a contract involving sales of trucks to the
People's Republic of China. The court stated that otherwise, the
damages
would be of such an order as to ruin the financial
equilibrium and the moral credit of Fruehauf-France,
S.A., and provoke its disappearance and the
unemployment of more than 600 workers .... [T]he
judge-referee must take into account the interests of
the company, rather than the personal interests of any
shareholders even if they be the majority.81
By the early 1980s, the ability of the United States to extend
its sanctions to U.S.-based MNEs extraterritorially was in serious
jeopardy. This became clear during the Russian gas pipeline affair, in
which the Reagan Administration tried to extend export control
regulations to "any partnership, association, corporation, or other
organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or
controlled by" U.S. corporations.82 A Dutch court held that this
regulation was not binding as a matter of international law and that a
Dutch wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. parent had to fulfill its
contractual obligation to sell geophones to the former Soviet Union.
The court stated that none of the established exceptions to the
79. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U.S. 480, 489-90 (1947).
80. See BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 178.
81. S.A. Soci~t& Fruehauf-France v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, 5 I.L.M. 476
(1966).
82. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (1985). The Russian gas
pipeline affair involved an attempt by the Reagan administration to block construction of a
natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe. See Kenneth A. Rodman,
Sanctions at Bay? Hegemonic Decline, Multinational Corporations, and U.S. Economic
Sanctions Since the Pipeline Case, 49 INT'L ORG. 105 (1995).
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territoriality principle applied.83 Under the nationality principle, the
Dutch subsidiary was a Dutch national. Under the protective
principle, the "foreign policy interest" involved did not jeopardize the
security or creditworthiness of the United States. Finally, the measure
did not involve "direct and illicit effects within the United States. 84
Since the pipeline debacle, the United States has generally not
attempted to apply its trading with the enemy legislation
extraterritorially, preferring other means of persuasion.8 5  Thus, in
terms of the matrix, this area falls into the right-side column on the
horizontal axis, suggesting that the law must be applied
extraterritorially to achieve its effect, but in the bottom row on the
vertical axis, suggesting that countries and MNEs disagree.
Extraterritorial application should thus be avoided unless agreement
with major allies can be achieved first.
B. Antitrust
Antitrust is another area in which the United States was a
pioneer in extraterritoriality. Initially, the Supreme Court held that
the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct overseas.86 In 1942,
however, Learned Hand decided in United States v. Aluminum
Company of America that a cartel concluded in Canada could be
subject to U.S. antitrust law if it had "effects" in the United States.87
The result has been a growing tendency to apply antitrust law
extraterritorially, which has given significant offense to our trading
partners.88 The European Union also has applied antitrust law on an
extraterritorial basis.89
83. These exceptions are defined in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
as the nationality principle, the effects doctrine and the protective principle. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987).
84. Compagnie Europgenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V. (Dist. Ct. The
Hague Sept. 17, 1982), 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983).
85. See Rodman, supra note 82, at 106 (arguing that in the cases of Nicaragua, Libya
and South Africa, sanctions have been successful despite their lack of extraterritorial
application). A notorious exception is the Helms-Burton Act, which does apply
extraterritorially, but has been repeatedly suspended by Presidents fearing the foreign policy
complications. Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (Mar. 12, 1996).
86. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
87. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 916 (1945); for more recent cases,
see, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T., 549 F.2d 597 (1976); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
88. See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982) (Eng.).
89. See, e.g., Case T-36/91, Imperial Chem. Indus. (ICI) v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. II-
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In the academic literature, there is general agreement that
antitrust law must be applied on an enterprise-wide basis to be
effective.9" On the other hand, there is also general recognition that
the interests and policies of countries diverge on antitrust issues.
Some of this divergence is purely self-interested, as when the
European Union almost blocked the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
merger to protect Airbus or when Japan and the United States both
sided with their respective MNE in the Kodak-Fuji dispute. 9' Other
sources of divergence, however, are more principled. EU competition
law tends to be more focused on protecting smaller market
competitors than U.S. competition law, which focuses exclusively on
efficiency and consumer welfare.
Thus, although there has been some measure of agreement on
international cooperation regarding antitrust matters, this area still
tends to fall into the bottom row on the vertical axis.92 Commentators
tend to agree that work needs to be done to resolve such disputes
because of the global reach of the issue.93 They disagree, however, on
the important question: What is the appropriate forum to resolve such
disagreements?94
C. Discrimination
In the area of gender discrimination,95 a couple of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions can illustrate the problem. In Sumitomo
Shoji America v. Avagliano, the Court held that the entity approach
applied to a discrimination suit filed by female employees of a
wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese MNE. The key issue
1847; Case 89/85, Ahlstrom v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193; Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v.
Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753.
90. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down,
and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in
Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and
International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142 (2001).
91. Fox, supra note 90, at 1803-04.
92. See, e.g., EU-U.S. and other bilateral agreements, and the work of the WTO and
OECD working groups. The U.S. guidelines for international antitrust recognize the
likelihood of disagreement, as do the balancing tests applied by courts. See, e.g., Timberlane,
549 F.2d at 597.
93. See Fox, supra note 90, at 1802-06.
94. Id. at 1802-04 (advocating an independent competition forum).
95. For a general discussion of international women's rights theory, see Karen Engle,
International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J INT'L L. 517
(1992).
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was whether the U.S.-Japan Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty, a precursor to current Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs")
protected the employment practices of the subsidiary. The Court held
that it did not provide such protection because the subsidiary was not
a "company of Japan." It is not clear how the Court would have
analyzed the issue had the MNE operated through a branch.96
Nine years later the Court faced a similar issue, but this time
the situation was reversed. In EEOC v. Aramco, the issue was
whether U.S. discrimination law applied to the actions of a U.S.-based
MNE operating through a branch in Saudi Arabia and allegedly
discriminating against a U.S. citizen employee. The Court held that it
did not apply, and established a general presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, unless Congress explicitly
stated otherwise.97
Aramco has been roundly criticized on several grounds. The
finding that Congress did not intend Title VII to apply
extraterritorially ran contrary to several strong indicators in the
statute, and, in fact, Congress immediately overturned that aspect of
the decision.98 More importantly, commentators such as Larry
Kramer pointed out that in Aramco, there was no real conflict with the
policy of the host country, since it was unlikely that Saudi Arabia
would object to a law forbidding religious and ethnic discrimination
against people like the plaintiff-i.e., Muslims of Arabic descent.99
However, one needs to take a broader view of the issue.
Gender discrimination is an extremely loaded cultural issue, as is
evidenced by the reservations of many countries to the International
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against
Women ("CEDAW")."'0 One can only imagine the response if the
United States were asked not to apply its law on discrimination to
Sumitomo Shoji on the grounds that Japanese norms on
discrimination should apply extraterritorially, or suppose that in
96. Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
97. EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (1991). The scope of the presumption may have
been narrowed by Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). Ironically, in
the same Term Chief Justice Rehnquist (who wrote for the majority in Aramco) also decided
that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency could enter the territory of a sovereign nation and
kidnap one of its citizens to bring him to justice in the United States-a far greater affront to
sovereignty than was involved in Aramco. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992).
98. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75
(1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)).
99. Kramer, supra note 22, at 217.
100. See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 70, at 400-04.
[42:5
HeinOnline  -- 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 30 2003-2004
2003] NATIONAL REGULATION OF MULTINA7IONAL ENTERPRISES 31
Aramco, the issue was discrimination by Aramco against women in
Saudi Arabia by not promoting them to jobs that require driving.
Thus, this Article argues that although discrimination law, like
child labor law, falls in the middle column on the horizontal axis
because one would like to see the law applied extraterritorially to all
MNEs, caution is warranted. That is because, unlike in the child
labor case, there is a real clash with deep-seated cultural norms of the
host country. While in some cases, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Congress may decide that the goal of the legislation is
important enough and the likelihood of conflict low enough to
warrant extraterritorial application, careful consideration needs to be
given in each instance to the potential clash with host country
interests in this area.''
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A WORLD INVESTMENT ORGANIZATION
The results of the proposed matrix for the examples discussed
above are as follows:
YAxis
Countries and Contracts Corruption Bankruptcy
MNEs agree
Countries Torts Child Labor Tax
agree but
MNEs do not
Countries Property Discrimination Antitrust &
disagree Trading with the
Enemy
Law does not Law partially Law requires XAxis
require requires extraterritoriality
extraterritoriality extraterritoriality
101. It helps, however, that the MNEs themselves are unlikely to want to engage in
gender discrimination, since it narrows the pool of available human capital. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 provides for a "foreign compulsion defense," for cases in which the statute
would require the employer to violate the law of the foreign country. Civil Rights Act of
1991 § 109(b). But this defense may be too narrow. See, e.g., Abrams v. Baylor Coll. of
Med., 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding insufficient the reasonable understanding of the
host government policy); Mannington Mills v. Congolenum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1984) (finding that mere approval or encouragement of conduct fails the actual compulsion
test).
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Comity, the case-by-case application of the enterprise
approach, is the preferred outcome in the first column. Unilateral
extraterritoriality with reciprocity is the preferred outcome in the top
and middle rows of the second and third columns. Harmonization is
the preferred outcome in the bottom row of the second and third
columns.
Much of the debate on how to achieve harmonization has
focused on the choice of an appropriate forum.0 2 In general, four
candidates present themselves: the OECD, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), the WTO, and
a new WIO.
The OECD is the preferred forum for coordinating action
when extraterritoriality with reciprocity is the preferred approach. In
these cases (those in the top two rows), there is no real clash of
interests among countries. Rather, the disputed issues resolve to
questions of competitiveness, involving the reluctance to take
unilateral action for fear of injuring domestic MNEs, and questions of
sovereignty, involving the reluctance to cede to extraterritorial
application even when there is no policy disagreement. As the
corruption and tax examples above illustrate, the OECD is the best
forum to resolve these issues because the overwhelming majority of
MNEs are from OECD home countries. Thus, if the OECD acts as a
whole, competitiveness concerns are abated. As for sovereignty,
since investment flows among OECD countries are bilateral,
reciprocity can be used to allay sovereignty concerns."3
For truly disputed issues, the OECD is not the right forum
because it excludes the developing world. This assertion has been
well illustrated by the debate over the MAI. Ultimately, the MAI
failed because of its exclusive focus on investor rights and neglect of
investor responsibilities. 4 The OECD, which remains a "rich
countries' club," is an inappropriate forum to negotiate agreements
when there is a fundamental policy disagreement with developing
102. Examples include the debates in antitrust between Fox and Guzman, and in tax
between Green and Slemrod!Avi-Yonah.
103. There may still be a sovereignty issue where the extraterritorial reach impacts non-
member countries, but in my view this is not a serious concern if there is no underlying
policy disagreement. Presumably, some transfer payment can be negotiated, as in the case of
tax havens.
104. On the demise of the MAI, see, e.g., Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 INT'L LAW. 1033 (2000); Yoshi
Kodama, Dispute Settlement under the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, J. INT'L
ARB., Sept. 1999, at 45, 46-52; Pippa Read, International Investment in the WTO: Prospects
and Challenges in the Shadow of the MAI, 11 BOND L. REv. 360, 368 (1999).
[42:5
HeinOnline  -- 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 32 2003-2004
2003] NATIONAL REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 33
countries."'
For the same reason, UNCTAD must be rejected. 0 6  Its
membership is as wide as the U.N., but it is too focused on the
interests of the developing countries, as the failed attempt to negotiate
a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations in the 1970s and
1980s indicates.10 7  UNCTAD heavily focuses on investor
responsibilities at the expense of investor rights.'
The WTO presents a tempting arena. It has broad
membership, with a significant voice for both developed and
developing countries. It also has a broad agenda, which makes trade-
offs possible even on highly contentious issues.'0 9  There are,
however, serious problems with this organization. First, the primary
mission of the WTO is focused on trade. While the line between
investment and trade issues has blurred recently due to the focus on
services through General Agreements on Trade in Services
("GATS")"° and FDI through Trade-Related Investment Measures
("TRIMs"),"' the overlap is not complete." 2 Thus, commentators
have pointed out that some tax and antitrust issues are more linked to
trade than others." 3 There is a danger of overwhelming the WTO
with issues unrelated to its. core mission and expertise, although that
mission, and the WTO staff, could perhaps be expanded to address
this problem.
More importantly, the WTO has a well-developed judicial
dispute resolution mechanism. While this characteristic is one of its
main advantages, there is a danger in extending such a mechanism to
105. The OECD has thirty members. With the exceptions of Mexico and South Korea,
none are developing countries. For a list of the membership, see the OECD website at
http://www.oecd.org.
106. On UNCTAD, see WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002, supra note 2, at ii.
107. Muchlinski, supra note 104, at 1037.
108. Id.
109. Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501,
1545-46 (1998).
110. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, [hereinafter Final Act]
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
111. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Final Act, supra note 110,
Annex IA, 33 I.L.M. at 1153 [hereinafter TRIMS].
112. These two agreements, GATS and TRIMS, are the product of the Uruguay Round
that established the WTO on January 1, 1995. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Final Act, supra note 110, 33 I.L.M. at 1144.
113. See Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal
with Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAx L. REV. 533, 547-48 (2002); Fox, supra note 90, at 1788.
HeinOnline  -- 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 33 2003-2004
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W
areas in which disagreement is more basic than in the trade context.
The risk is that countries will ignore the decisions of the WTO
Appellate Body and the whole enterprise will unravel. In fact, the
strong dispute resolution mechanism in the draft MAI was one of the
main reasons for its failure." 4
What is needed is a forum that has broad membership with
strong representation from both developed and developing countries;
a broad agenda making "horse trading" possible; and representation
for MNEs, who can bring pressure to bear when they perceive
harmonization to be in their interests, and NGOs, who can bring
pressure when MNEs disagree. In addition, the forum should operate
under a consensus rule similar to the pre-1994 GATT." 5 That is, if a
member feels that its sovereignty is too adversely affected by a
dispute resolution determination, it can block it, but at a reputational
cost that in practice ensures that such blockages will not occur too
frequently.
Such a body has been proposed in divergent areas such as
antitrust"16 and tax." 7 One goal of this Article has been to show that
these areas present some similarities and therefore a single
organization, the WIO, may be appropriate to cover both, as well as
other areas in which harmonization is the preferred outcome.
Harmonization may, in fact, be difficult to achieve, but partial
progress may be possible even in the difficult areas.
Legislators and courts frequently need to decide if national
laws should apply to MNEs as a whole or only within their territory.
This Article has suggested a way to analyze the relevant issues and to
help focus time-consuming efforts to harmonize national laws on
those subject areas where harmonization is truly necessary." 8 In
other areas, extraterritoriality is either not needed or can be applied
unilaterally. Hopefully, the analysis presented above can be a useful
framework for addressing the difficult question of how national laws
should apply to enterprises operating beyond national borders.
114. Kodama, supra note 104, at 46-52.
115. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 186.
116. Fox, supra note 90.
117. Vito Tanzi, Does the World Need a World Tax Organization?, in THE ECONOMICS
OF GLOBALIZATION 173 (Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka eds., 1999).
118. One of the reasons the MAI failed is that its reach was too broad. A MAI that is
more focused may have a better chance of success. See Muchlinski, supra note 104, at 1037-
46.
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